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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Reproductive matters are a profound example of a moral and ethical issue in respect of which 
the legal regimes of the Member States of the European Union (EU) differ considerably.2 States 
have – often consciously – made different choices in respect of abortion, assisted human 
reproduction (AHR) and surrogacy. Regimes differ with respect to legality of and access to these 
services, with respect to reimbursement for treatment, as well as regarding the rights and 
recognition of children born following reproductive treatment.  
This diversity in regimes is one of the major reasons why phenomena like cross-border 
abortions, cross-border reproductive care (CBRC) and cross-border surrogacy have occurred 
over the past decades.3 Although exhaustive statistics on the scale of such cross-border 
movement within the EU are lacking, the existence of these phenomena cannot be denied. For 
example, the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) estimated in 
2008 that at least 11,000-14,000 services recipients are involved in cross-border reproductive 
care (CBRC) within the EU every year.4 As the study acknowledged, these numbers may be even 
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higher in reality. Further, they may have increased since the year 2008 and may continue to 
increase in the future.  
States consequently are more and more often confronted with one another’s regimes. This 
raises a number of difficult questions. One of these is if States should accommodate (the effects 
of) different foreign choices in reproductive issues or whether they can protect their own 
standards, for instance by refusing reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad or by invoking 
public policy clauses in cases of cross-border surrogacy. Another question is if States are or 
should be allowed to hide behind other States’ regimes, and outsource the protection of rights 
in these sensitive matters, by referring to the laws of other States. Within the special multilevel 
context of the EU, these questions gain even more depth, particularly now that an area is 
concerned in which the EU has no or (very) limited competences.5  
 
Section 3 of this paper explores and typifies various (potential) legal responses at national level 
to cross-border movement in reproductive matters. It is thereby assessed how these are 
influenced by perspectives like equality and the interests of the (unborn or future) child. Also, it 
is examined to what extent European law leaves room for such responses at national level, or 
may even dictate certain legal responses. In order to give a framework to that assessment, 
section 2 firstly sets out the relevant standards in reproductive matters, under both EU law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).6 Section 2 shows that States are granted 
States considerable room under European law to make their own (moral and ethical) choices in 
reproductive matters, but certain standards and principles must nonetheless be observed. These 
standards and principle may prove also – or perhaps even more – relevant in cross-border 
situations. Section 2 thus lays a basis for section 3, where discussion of the various legal 
responses leads to the identification of an emerging European framework for cross-border 
movement in reproductive matters.   
  
2. EUROPEAN LAW AND REPRODUCTIVE MATTERS  
 
2.1 EU LAW 
 
At EU level there is very little substantive standard setting in the field of reproductive matters. 
For example, there is no EU legislation that obliges the Member States to legalise abortion, or to 
prohibit AHR treatment with the use of donor gametes. In respect of these sensitive issues the 
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EU Member States have not been very willing to transfer competences to the Union; in respect 
of health the EU has a coordinating competence only,7 while in the field of family law it has no 
competence at all, except when measures concerning family law ‘having cross-border 
implications’ are concerned.8  
There are two EU Directives which deal with AHR-related matters, but their substantive 
standard-setting in the area is fairly limited. The In vitro diagnostic medical devices Directive 
(1998)9 provides for harmonisation of national provisions governing the placing on the market of 
so-called in vitro diagnostic medical devices, including in vitro fertilisation and assisted 
reproduction technologies products. Under this Directive Member States may not create any 
obstacle to the placing on the market or the putting into service within their territory of in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices which meet certain (design and manufacturing) requirements. The 
Directive does, however, not affect their ability to regulate – or even prohibit – the use of such 
devices within their territory. The Tissues and Cells Directive (2004)10, on the other hand, deals 
with more substantive AHR-issues, but its harmonising effect is limited. It provides that Member 
States must ‘endavour to ensure’ voluntary and unpaid donations of gametes.11 Also, as a 
matter of principle, such donation must be anonymous, although this is ‘without prejudice to 
legislation in force in Member States on the conditions for disclosure, notably in the case of 
gametes donation’.12 States are furthermore free to prohibit the donation, processing or 
procurement of gametes, they may prohibit or restrict the import of such cells and they are free 
to introduce requirements for voluntary unpaid donation.13 The latter effectively limits the 
harmonizing effect of this Directive in the field of AHR.14  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights contains various rights that are (potentially) relevant for 
reproductive matters – such as the right to human dignity, the right to physical integrity 
(including the prohibition of eugenic practices), the right to respect for private and family life 
and the rights of the child15 – but application of the Charter is only triggered in issues that come 
within the scope of EU law.16 Most scenario’s involving reproductive matters are, however, 
excluded from the scope of EU law, rendering the potential of these rights in the context of 
reproductive matters thus also limited. This may be different in cross-border situations, as 
further explained in section 3.2.1 below.  
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The (potential) relevance of the EU’s non-discrimination law for issues like access to 
reproductive treatment is also limited. The current framework prohibits discrimination on 
grounds such as age and sexual orientation, but it applies to employment, occupation and 
vocational training only.17 A proposal for a more general Equal Treatment Directive has been on 
the table for a long time now, which intends to expand the reach of EU law to matters like social 
protection, health care and access to goods and services which are available to the public.18 
Reproductive rights were, however, explicitly excluded from the scope of the Directive as 
proposed by the Commission and as yet the proposal has not been amended on this point, 
despite certain amendments to this effect. 19  In fact, given the amount of controversy 
surrounding the proposal as a whole, it seems doubtful if the Directive will ever be adopted at 
all.20  
Thus far, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has also been offered little 
opportunity to pronounce itself on reproduction related matters. Only a few employment cases 
have some, albeit a very limited, impact on the substantive regulation of these matters in the 
Member States. For example, in Sabine Mayr (2008) the Court held that the protection of EU 
law of pregnant workers against dismissal extends to women who are in ‘an advanced stage of 
in vitro fertilization treatment’.21 Mindful of the fact that ‘artificial fertilisation and viable cells 
treatment is a very sensitive social issue in many Member States, marked by their multiple 
traditions and value systems’, the CJEU made very clear that it gave a ‘legal interpretation’ of 
the relevant provisions of the relevant Directive 92/85 only, and that it was not called upon ‘to 
broach medical or ethical questions’.22 A similar caution was issued in a later case in the area of 
patent law, where the Court however accorded a certain protection to the human embryo by 
holding that a process entailing its destruction could not be patented.23 Further, in its recent 
judgments in the cases C. D and Z. (2014), the CJEU was rather firm in holding that EU law did 
not provide for any entitlements for commissioning mothers who had a child through a 
surrogacy agreement to paid leave equivalent to maternity leave or adoption leave.24  
There are various open questions as to the application of the EU law to cross-border movement 
in reproductive matters. While there is an extensive body of EU law on cross-border health care 
in general, little is provided for the specific areas of cross-border reproductive care, cross-border 
abortions and cross-border surrogacy. 25  There is also hardly any CJEU case-law on the 
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application of the relevant instruments and the general EU free movement rules to these 
situations. What is clear, however, is that abortion and AHR treatment, being medical activities, 
fall within the definition of ‘services’ within the meaning of the TFEU, provided they are legally 
provided for remuneration in at least one EU Member State.26 Surrogacy may in itself also be 
considered a service.27 The freedom to provide and receive services is, however, not unlimited 
and may be restricted. Such a restriction may, of course, in itself be considered a legal response 
to cross-border movement. Section 3.1 discusses such restrictions in cases concerning 
reproductive matters and assesses if they can (potentially) be justified under EU law. In all cross-
border situations fundamental rights, including those as guaranteed by the ECHR must be 
observed,28 rendering it even more important to examine what level of protection is required 
under the ECHR in reproductive matters.  
  
2.2 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
At the Council of Europe level it is mainly the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) on the basis of the ECHR that has impacted national standard-setting in reproductive 
matters.29 The ECtHR’s case-law in this area, while still fairly limited, is steadily expanding. There 
have been various abortion cases decided by the Court, and also a few cases concerning AHR. So 
far the ECtHR has not ruled in in any surrogacy case, but as further discussed below, there are 
interesting cases pending before the Court.30  
Reproductive matters come within the scope of the ECHR, as they fall under the right to respect 
for private life (Article 8 ECHR). The Court has, for instance, ruled that the decision of a pregnant 
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woman to continue her pregnancy or not comes within the scope of Article 8.31 Also, the notion 
‘private life’ of Article 8 includes a right to respect for the decision to become a (genetic) 
parent.32 This includes ‘the right of a couple to conceive a child and to make use of medically 
assisted procreation for that purpose’.33 These rights, however, do not enjoy very strong 
protection under the Convention. The Court generally leaves States a wide margin of 
appreciation in dealing with these moral and ethical issues, which involve a complex balancing 
of various individual interests.34 It has accordingly held that the right to respect for private life as 
protected under Article 8 ECHR cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion35 and 
that the Convention does not cover a right to procreation.36 Also, it never pronounced itself 
upon the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 ECHR (the 
right to life)37 and has left it to States to decide whether a right to know ones genetic parents is 
protected at national level.38 As a result, even far-reaching interferences with Article 8 in 
reproductive matters have been held not to violate the Convention. In the abortion case of  
A, B and C v Ireland (2010), for example, the Grand Chamber of the Court held that a complete 
prohibition on abortions for health and/or well-being reasons constituted no violation of Article 
8, but fell within the State’s margin of appreciation.39 The Court thereby had regard to the fact 
that Irish women could lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate 
information and medical care in Ireland.40 In S H and Others v Austria (2011), the Grand 
Chamber held that an absolute prohibition on the use of donated gametes in the course of IVF-
treatment did not exceed the respondent State’s margin of appreciation. In that case the Court 
explained that the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State was a wide one 
‘since the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a 
background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the questions raised 
by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common ground amongst the Member 
States’.41  
While it is very common in the ECtHR case-law that a lack of consensus widens the margin of 
appreciation of the State, the Court has introduced some variations on its well-established 
doctrine especially in the context of reproductive rights. In S H and Others, for example, the 
Court seemed to set the barrier higher than it had done so far in its case-law, by holding that for 
a common ground to decisively narrow the margin, it had to be ‘based on settled and long-
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 Vo (n 31), para. 85.  
38
 Inter alia ECtHR 13 February 2003, Odièvre v France, no. 42326/98 and ECtHR 22 March 2012, Ahrens v Germany,  
no. 45071/09.  
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 A, B and C (n 31), para. 241. 
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standing principles established in the law of the member States’.42 In the abortion case  
A, B and C the Court took an unprecedented approach in defining the issue on which such 
consensus had to exist. While the Court acknowledged that there was indeed a consensus 
amongst a substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards 
allowing abortion ‘on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law’, this consensus did not 
decisively narrow the broad margin of appreciation of the State, because there was no European 
consensus on the question whether the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes 
of Article 2 ECHR.43  
As these variations on the margin of appreciation doctrine illustrate, the Court is thus very 
reluctant to intervene in reproductive matters. States are left much room to introduce change at 
their own pace, as long as the competing interests have been weighed in the national legislative 
process, and as long as they keep this area under review. 44 Potentially less room is left to States 
under the ECHR when cross-border situations are concerned.45  
Moreover, it must be borne in mind, that the Convention only sets a minimum standard and 
that States are free to offer a higher level of protection to the Convention rights. Interestingly, it 
is exactly in that situation that the Convention has a more implicit impact. While principled 
choices in reproductive matters are left to the States, the fact that reproductive matters come 
within the scope of the Convention means that, as soon as a State regulates this area of law, 
certain general obligations resulting from the Convention apply. These entail that (1) the right or 
entitlement granted at national level must be effective; (2) the relevant legislation must be 
coherent and (3) the right or entitlement must be granted in a non-discriminatory manner.  
Following settled case-law the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.46 In the abortion context this 
has been held to mean that if a legislator allows for abortion in certain circumstances, it also has 
to protect certain procedural rights. The relevant procedure ‘should guarantee to a pregnant 
woman at least a possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered’,47 the 
competent body or person should issue written grounds for its decision48 and the pregnant 
woman should have effective access to relevant information on her and the foetus’ health.49 The 
latter includes access to diagnostic services, decisive for the possibility for the pregnant woman 
of exercising her right to take an informed decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not.50  
States must furthermore shape their legal framework in the area of reproductive matters ‘in a 
coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be adequately 
taken into account.’51 On the basis of such coherency reasoning the Court has considered Italian 
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 A, B and C (n 31), paras. 235-237.  
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 S H and Others (n 33), paras. 103 and 118. The Court accepted that States adopt rules in this area which do not provide 
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 Idem.  
49
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legislation that denied a couple access to Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnose (PID) in the course 
of AHR treatment but authorised medically-assisted termination of pregnancy if the foetus 
showed symptoms of the same disease, incoherent and inconsistent. 52 As a result, the couple 
was left with only one choice, which moreover brought anxiety and suffering, namely to start a 
pregnancy by natural means and terminate it if prenatal tests showed the foetus to have the 
disease. Noting and stressing that this concerned a specific case, which affected apart from Italy 
only two more High Contracting Parties, the Court concluded that the interference with the 
applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life was disproportionate.  
Thirdly, rights and entitlements that come within the scope of the Convention must be awarded 
in a non-discriminatory manner.53 In S H and others the Chamber had found a violation of the 
Convention on the basis of such reasoning,54 but this was later overruled by the Grand Chamber. 
The non-discrimination requirement may be applied in cases where same-sex couples claim 
access to AHR treatment. In Gas and Dubois v France (2012), however, the Court held the 
applicants, a same-sex couple, to be not in a similar situation to infertile heterosexual couples.55 
The potential of this non-discrimination requirement in cross-border situations must yet be 
explored. It may limit the States’ room for responding to cross-border movement in 
reproductive matters, although it is also possible that the Court takes a fairly narrow approach 
in defining the relevantly similar situations.   
The ECtHR’s case-law in the area of reproductive matters thus has its own dynamic. States can 
maintain very restrictive regimes and they are given ample room to introduce change at their 
own pace, but as soon as they make one step in the direction of awarding more rights in this 
field, they also have to meet certain (procedural) obligations that effectively limit their freedom 
in these complex matters. In other words, the Court’s line of reasoning may lead to a sharper 
divide in Europe in these matters. These implications of the ECtHR’s case-law may be partially 
alleviated by another unique line of reasoning of the Court which seems to imply that States can 
outsource their obligations under the Convention in this sphere, as long as they meet certain 
minimum obligations. This point is further developed in the following section where legal 
responses to cross-border movement in reproductive matters are discussed.  
 
3. LEGAL RESPONSES TO CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT 
 
States may react and respond to cross-border movement in reproductive matters in various 
ways. This section explores a number of (potential) legal responses of States that function as 
countries of origin in these situations.56 Being confronted with one another’s regimes, States 
may try to protect their own standards, by warding off (the effects of) such cross-border 
movement. States may also take a more pragmatic approach and accommodate for (the effects 
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of) different foreign choices in reproductive issues.57 Lastly cross-border movement may enable 
States to hide behind other States’ regimes and to outsource the protection of rights in these 
sensitive matters. Principled and protectionist legal responses are discussed in section 3.1, while 
accommodating responses are discussed in 3.2 and section 3.3 discusses outsourcing. It thereby 
is explored to what extent European law leaves room for each of responses, or even dictates 
them. As will become clear from that exercise, there are as yet various open questions in 
respect of the implications of European law in this area. Nonetheless an emerging rule system 
applying to cross-border situations in reproductive matters can be identified   
 
3.1 WARDING OFF 
 
Legal responses that intend to ward off (the effects of) cross-border movement in reproductive 
matters may take different shapes. The most far reaching principled response consists in trying 
to prevent such cross-border movement from taking place in the first place, for instance by 
imposing a travel ban, or by criminally prosecuting for involvement in treatment obtained 
abroad.58 While space does not allow an extensive legal analysis on this point, it is submitted 
that such travel bans and criminal prosecutions are hard to justify under EU free movement 
law.59 In any case, there have only been incidental reports of such far reaching measures being 
taken by EU Member States.60 Given the drastic nature of such measures and difficulties in 
enforcing them,61 States are more likely to resort to other, nonetheless principled, legal 
responses. For example, as discussed in section 3.1.1, they may refuse to recognise the legal 
effects of foreign treatment options. They may also (wish to) ban information about such 
foreign options (section 3.1.2), refuse reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad (section 
3.1.3) or refuse follow-up care upon return (section 3.1.4).   
 
                                                                
57
 The terms ‘principled’, ‘protectionist’ and ‘pragmatic’ are used descriptive and not normative.  
58
 See also R F Storrow, ‘Assisted Reproduction on treacherous terrain: the legal hazards of cross-border reproductive 
travel’, Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) 23, p. 538-545 and W van Hoof and G Pennings, ‘Extraterritoriality for 
cross-border reproductive care; should states act against citizens travelling abroad for illegal infertility treatment?’, 
Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) 23, p. 546-554. In Turkey a law was introduced in 2010 following which 
individuals who travelled abroad for AHR treatment involving donated gametes or surrogacy, could be prosecuted. Z B 
Gürtin, ‘Banning reproductive travel: Turkey’s ART legislation and third-party assisted reproduction, Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online (2011) 23, p. 555-564.  
59
 Cf. Grogan, C-159/90, Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 11 June 1991 [1991] ECR I-4703, para. 35.  
60
 A unique example of a case where an EU Member State imposed a travel ban in this context concerns the Irish X-case. 
A 14-year-old girl who was pregnant as a result of multiple rape and wished to travel to the United Kingdom to have an 
abortion, was prevented by Court order from leaving Ireland for a period of nine months. On appeal the injunction was 
lifted. The Irish Supreme Court decided the case – including its travel aspect – on the basis of national law only, thereby 
avoiding issues of European free movement law. Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 53, [1992] ILRM 401 at 425, [1992] 
2 CMLR 277 at 300. Soon after the judgment the Irish Constitution was amended; section 40.3 which protects the right to 
life of the unborn, now provides that it not does not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state.  
Prosecution practice in the area of reproductive matters is generally low. An example of an incidental report of criminal 
prosecution by an EU Member States for treatment obtained in another Member States comes from the Netherlands. In 
2008 charges were brought against a Dutch woman who had an abortion after 28 weeks of pregnancy, in a controversial 
abortion clinic in Spain. The charges were later dropped on grounds of the special circumstances of the case. ‘OM staakt 
vervolging late abortus in Spanje’, NRC Handelsblad, 4 December 2008, p. 2.  
61
 Van Hoof and Pennings 2011 (n 58), p. 551. 
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3.1.1 NON-RECOGNITION OF LEGAL EFFECTS 
The classic Private International Law answer to undesired effects of deviating foreign regimes, is 
the invocation of public policy clauses. In various cross-border surrogacy cases such clauses have 
indeed been successfully relied upon. For instance, there have been examples where intended 
parents met with refusals by authorities in their home country to issue a passport to the child 
that was born with a surrogate mother in a foreign country. Even if the intended parents are 
able to enter their State with the child, they may still encounter problems in establishing 
parental links with the child. Various national courts have refused recognition to foreign birth 
certificates on which intended parents were stated as legal parents.62 There have even been 
examples where the child was subsequently placed for adoption.63 On similar grounds may 
courts refuse to enforce a foreign judgment declaring the intended parents the legal parents of 
the child.  
In reproductive matters public policy grounds are often closely related to the interests of the 
child. In a German case of 2007, for instance, a Court refused to enforce the judgment of a 
Turkish court awarding the adoption rights over a child to a German couple who had arranged a 
surrogacy agreement with a Turkish family. The Court held this Turkish judgment to be against 
the child’s best interests, as the child had only been given birth with the aim of being handed 
over to the German intended parents.64 Another example of such reasoning can be found in 
Dutch law, where a birth certificate on which intended parents are stated as legal parents is 
considered contrary to public policy, inter alia because the child has the right to know his or her 
genetic origins.65  
The interests of the child may, however, also lead to exactly opposite conclusions in cross-
border surrogacy cases. In various such cases, it was (after all) held that the interest of the child 
in fact required the awarding of travel documents, or even the award of parental rights to the 
intended parents.66 As a result the different foreign choice was thus de facto accommodated for. 
As further explained in section 3.2.1 below it is as yet an open question whether under 
European law States are under an obligation to take such an accommodating approach to cross-
border surrogacy.  
 
3.1.2 BANS ON INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN SERVICES  
Cross-border movement in reproductive matters may also be warded off by means of bans on 
information about foreign treatment options. There have been a few cases before the European 
Courts where such bans had indeed been imposed in respect of foreign abortion services. 
                                                                
62
 E.g. District Court The Hague (Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage), 24 October 2011, LJN BU3627. See also the cases pending 
before the ECtHR (n 30). 
63
 See Paradiso and Campanelli (n 30).  
64
 AG (Administrative Court) Hamm 13 March 2007, Az XVI 23/06. See also LG (State Court) Dortmund (dec.) 13 August 
2007, Az 15 T 87/07.  
65
 See I Curry-Sumner, JPF 2012/13 and S C A van Vlijmen and J H van der Tol, ‘Draagmoederschap in opkomst: 
specifieke wet- en regelgeving noodzakelijk?’, FJR 2012/56. See also District Court The Hague (Rechtbank 's-
Gravenhage) 14 September 2009, LJN BK1197.  
66
 See section 3.2.1 below.  
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In Grogan (1991) the CJEU did not decide the thorny issue whether an Irish prohibition on 
distribution of information regarding abortion services in the UK could be justified under EU law. 
The Court namely held that the link between the activity of the defendant student associations 
and medical terminations of pregnancies carried out in clinics in the UK was ‘too tenuous’ for 
the prohibition on the distribution of information to be capable of being regarded as a 
restriction within the meaning of (then) Article 59 of the Treaty.67 The Advocate General in the 
case had instead addressed the justification question and had concluded that the information 
prohibition was not precluded under EU law.68 No further cases on this particular issue have come 
before the CJEU since, but the Patient Mobility Directive, however, has introduced considerable 
rights to information for patients involved in cross-border care (see section 3.2.2 below).  
The Irish ban on information about foreign abortion services subsequently proved problematic 
under the ECHR. In Open Door (1992) the ECtHR held an injunction restraining Irish counselling 
agencies from assisting pregnant women in seeking legal abortion services abroad, to violate the 
freedom to impart and receive information (Article 10 ECHR).69 The Court was struck by the 
absolute nature of the injunction ‘which imposed a "perpetual" restraint on the provision of 
information to pregnant women concerning abortion facilities abroad, regardless of age or state 
of health or their reasons for seeking counselling on the termination of pregnancy’. The Court 
further noted that the link between the provision of information and the destruction of unborn 
life was not as definite as contended; that information could be obtained from other sources in 
Ireland and that the restriction could not effectively protect the right to life of the unborn since 
it did not prevent large numbers of Irish women from continuing to obtain abortions in the UK. 
It also held that the injunction created a risk to the health of those women seeking abortions at 
a later stage in their pregnancy due to the lack of proper counselling and that it had adverse 
effects on women who were not sufficiently resourceful or did not have the necessary level of 
education to have access to alternative sources of information.70  
Further authority for the claim that a refusal to provide information about foreign abortion 
services constitutes (or contributes to) a violation of the ECHR can be found in the the A, B and C 
case. As yet noted above, one of the elements of the justification of the restrictive Irish abortion 
laws was that women who travelled abroad for an abortion had access ‘to appropriate 
information and medical care’ in Ireland.71  
Given the specific context of the Irish abortion cases, one may wish to be careful in applying 
these findings analogously to situations concerning AHR or surrogacy, but the reasoning 
concerning effectiveness and implications of the information ban, may very well hold in other 
CBRC cases.    
 
  
                                                                
67
 Presently Article 56 TFEU. Grogan (n 26), para. 32.  
68
 Advocate General van Gerven considered the restriction not disproportionate because the Irish prohibition did not ban 
all information but only information which assisted pregnant women to terminate unborn life. Opinion in Grogan (n 59), 
para. 35.  
69
 ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88. 
70
 Idem, paras. 73-77. 
71
 A, B and C (n 31), para. 241. See also 3.1.4 and 3.2.2 below.  
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3.1.3 REFUSALS OF REIMBURSEMENT AND PRIOR AUTHORISATION REQUIREMENTS 
Another way for States to ward off foreign choices they consider undesirable or unethical, is 
through refusing reimbursement to individuals or couples who availed themselves of foreign 
treatment options or by setting prior authorization requirements. The basic rule under EU free 
movement law is that States do not have to reimburse treatment obtained abroad, if such 
treatment is prohibited under the domestic law, or if its national scheme does not provide for 
reimbursement for that kind of treatment.72 Hence, if a State prohibits certain reproductive 
treatment, it is under no obligation to reimburse the costs if such treatment is obtained abroad. 
In practice, this rule may prove problematic in the context of reproductive treatment, however,  
as it may be debated if medical and ethical standards may be taken into account in this 
assessment.73  
Whether prior authorisation requirements can be set for pregnancy terminations and AHR 
treatment (either or not involving surrogacy) is more questionable. Firstly, it is not clear if these 
can be, as necessary, qualified as so-called ‘scheduled treatment’.74 Further, under the Patient 
Mobility Directive a prior authorisation requirement for scheduled treatment can only be set if 
the treatment involves overnight hospital accommodation of the patient in question for at least 
one night or if it requires use of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or 
medical equipment.75 As a rule no hospital accommodation is required for abortion and AHR 
treatment.76 Whether any of these types of treatment involve ‘highly specialised and cost-
intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment’, within the meaning of the Directive is 
less obvious, 77  but new medical and technological developments may lead to different 
conclusions in this regard. Prior authorisation may also be refused on the basis of safety and 
quality concerns.78 In the case of AHR treatment such a refusal may be barred, however, by the 
existence of minimum harmonization in this field by means of the Tissues and Cells Directive 
                                                                
72
 Article 7 Directive 2011/24/EU. Additional costs, such as costs for board, lodging, travel, visitors’ tax and the making of 
a final medical report, can also not be claimed in this situation. Ludwig Leichtle, C-8/02, judgment of 18 March 2004 
[2004] ECR I-02641. 
73
 For example, the Dutch Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters (Centrale Raad van 
Beroep) ruled in 2007 that IVF treatment with the use of anonymously donated egg-cells was not amongst the benefits 
provided for under the Dutch Health Insurance Act and that therefore a refusal to reimburse for such treatment obtained 
abroad, constituted no obstacle of the freedom to receive services (judgment of 31 January 2007, LJN AZ8510). The 
Health Care Insurance Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen’) and the Dutch government had earlier taken a contrary 
position on the matter. Annex to Parliamentary Documents (Kamerstukken II)  33000-XVI no. 188, p. 6 and Parliamentary 
Documents (Kamerstukken II) 2010-2011 , Appendix (Aanhangsel) to Proceedings (Handelingen) no. 238, p. 1-2 and 
Health Care Insurance Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen) Opinion no. 26084415 of 24 October 2006. 
74
 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, C-157/99, judgment of 12 July 2001 [2001] ECR I-05473, para. 76. From the ECJ’s case-
law it follows that in this regard, not so much the hospital environment, but the planning element of the treatment is 
decisive. Müller-Fauré and van Riet, C-385/99, judgment of 13 May 2003 [2003] ECR I-04509, para. 75 and Commission v 
France, C-512/08, judgment of 5 October 2010 [2010] ECR I-08833, para. 34.  
75
 Article 8 (2) (a) Directive 2011/24/EU.  
76
 Within the EU practices vary as to the place where abortions and AHR treatment take place; this may be in (special 
clinics within) hospitals or in private clinics. Generally, also in situations where the treatment is carried out in a hospital, 
no accommodation for the night is required. 
77
 The CJEU has so far given only limited guidance on this point. See Commission v France (n @), para. 33-34.  
78
 Article 8 (2) (c) Directive 2011/24/EU. See also W Palm and R Baeten, ‘The quality and safety paradox in the patients’ 
rights Directive’, Eur J Public Health (2011) 21 (3), p. 273. 
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(see 2.1 above).79 In respect of abortion, however, no such harmonisation is in place.  
 
3.1.4 REFUSALS OF FOLLOW-UP CARE 
At a more practical level protectionist responses may consist in refusals of providing aftercare. 
For example, in 2010 it was reported that fifty percent of the Dutch gynaecologists refused to 
provide treatment to women who had AHR treatment with the use of commercially and 
anonymously donated egg cells in Spain.80 It is as yet an open question whether European law 
leaves room for such refusals. Under the EU Patient Mobility Directive a State of affiliation must 
ensure that the same medical follow-up is available ‘as would have been if that healthcare had 
been provided on its territory.’81 From this it could be concluded that there is no such obligation 
if the respective treatment is prohibited in the country of affiliation, but whether this is a correct 
reading of the relevant provision is insufficiently clear.  
A refusal to provide follow-up care after abortion may contribute to a violation of the ECHR, as 
follows from the A, B and C case, where the Court considered access to medical care in Ireland 
after an abortion abroad a precondition for the justification of the very restrictive Irish abortion 
laws.82 While there is no case-law on this point yet, it is well possible that such reasoning would 
also apply in CBRC cases. Refusals to provide (necessary) care may in any case in themselves 
prove incommensurable with fundamental rights and national codes of conduct for the medical 
profession.   
 
3.2 ACCOMMODATION  
 
Instead of warding them off, States may also in some way or another accommodate for the 
effects of deviating foreign choices in reproductive matters with which they are confronted 
through cross-border movement. Below accommodating responses are discussed that form the 
counterpart of the protectionist responses discussed in the previous section. The first concerns  
recognition of the legal effects of foreign treatment options (section 3.2.1). Less intrusive forms 
of accommodation may consist of information provision, reimbursement and follow-up care.  
  
3.2.1 RECOGNITION OF LEGAL EFFECTS 
In various cross-border surrogacy cases national courts have taken an accommodating approach 
by recognising the legal effects of foreign options. For example, in several Dutch cases where 
the authorities had refused to issue a passport to a child born abroad following surrogacy, the 
Court ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue emergency travel documents, as it 
                                                                
79
 Article 8 (2) (c) Directive 2011/24/EU. 
80
 As stated by the spokesman of the Dutch Association for Gynaeclogists during an interview for the Dutch tv-
programme Nieuwsuur, broadcasted on Dutch television on 9 September 2010, online available at 
<http://nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/183384-spanje-is-hoop-voor-onvruchtbare-vrouwen.html> (last accessed 30 March 
2014).  
81
 Article 5 (c) Directive 2011/24/EU.  
82
 A, B and C  (n 31), para. 241. 
14 
 
considered this to be dictated by the best interests of the child.83 Accommodation may also have 
less an ad hoc character, by providing for the recognition of parental links established abroad, 
even if the formation of such links is not possible under the law of the home-state itself. Again in 
Dutch cross-border surrogacy cases, putting the interest of the child first instead led – as time 
elapsed – to the award of parental rights to (at least one of) the intended parents.84 The 
Secretary of State for Security and Justice consequently concluded that as a result of the 
approach of the Dutch courts in surrogacy cases, standing policy was overtaken by practice and 
its enforcement was rendered more difficult. He therefore proposed that foreign surrogacy 
agreements would be given legal effect in the Netherlands if at least one of the commissioning 
parents was genetically related to the child and the other genetic parent was known. It was also 
proposed that the reimbursement of expenses for foreign surrogate mothers would not be 
taken into account in the examination of the public policy exceptions in international surrogacy 
cases, as – so he alleged – ‘profit’ could not be defined unequivocally in the international 
context. 85  
As the Dutch example shows, accommodation may thus be inspired or even dictated by 
overriding interests, such as the rights of the child. It is as yet an open question if EU (free 
movement) law also dictates an accommodation approach in cross-border surrogacy situations. 
In most situations where EU Member States refused recognition in cross-border surrogacy 
cases, the reproductive treatment involving the surrogacy agreement had taken place a third 
country.86 Such situations fall outside the scope of EU law and there is thus under EU law no 
obligation on Member States to recognise court judgments or birth certificates from these 
countries. States can apply their own PIL-regimes in these cases.87 This could be different, 
however, if  another EU Member State is involved.  
None of the existing EU PIL instruments applies to cross-border surrogacy cases,88 but a refusal 
by an EU Member State to give recognition to a birth certificate issued in another Member 
States may prove problematic under EU law. If the intended parents are EU citizens they may 
rely on their free movement rights and they may also invoke the citizenship rights of the child.89 
Non-recognition of the birth certificate may well be considered a restriction of these free 
                                                                
83
 Summary proceedings judge (Voorzieningenrechter) District Court The Hague (Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage), 9 November 
2010, LJN BP3764 and Summary proceedings judge (Voorzieningenrechter) District Court Haarlem 10 January 2011,  
LJN BP0426. 
84
 E.g. District Court The Hague (Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage) 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844 and District Court The Hague 
(Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage) 18 January 2012, LJN BV2597.  
85
 Parliamentary Documents (Kamerstukken II) 2011-2012, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 4.  
86
 This for instance holds for all cases currently pending before the ECtHR (n 30). 
87
 There is interesting work on surrogacy in progress within context of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law. See <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=178> (last accessed 29 March 2014).  
88
 Regulation 2201/2003 sees at parental responsibility only, but does not cover the establishment of legal parenthood. 
See surrogacy report p. 154. There is furthermore no EU PIL-instrument on recognition of civil status documents, 
although the first explorative steps in this regard have been taken by the European Commission in its Green Paper ‘Less 
bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status 
records, Brussels, 14.12.2010 COM(2010) 747 final. Lastly, (non-)contractual obligations arising out of family relationships 
are explicitly excluded from the scope of the relevant Regulations. See Article 1(2)(b) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 
(‘Rome I’) and Article 1(2)(a) Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (‘Rome II’). See Brunet a.o. 2013 (n 27), p. 148. 
89
 Article 21 TFEU.  
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movement rights.90 While public policy grounds may be accepted as justification for such a 
restriction, and while the CJEU has proven respectful for national identity arguments in cases 
concerning the spelling of names,91 it is doubtful if such a case would pass the proportionality 
test. Forceful counter-arguments would namely be the rights of the child and the right to 
respect for family life, which States have to protect when they act within the scope of EU law.92  
The latter consideration makes it even more interesting to see what approach the ECtHR will 
take in the currently pending cross-border surrogacy cases. 93  It is possible that this Court rules 
that States are under the Convention under an obligation to take an accommodating approach. 
In fact, the ECtHR has already taken such an approach in a cross-border adoption cases. In 
Wagner Luxembourg courts had refused to have an adoption decision pronounced in Peru 
declared enforceable in Luxembourg, because Luxembourg law made no provision for full 
adoption by a single woman. 94  The ECtHR ruled that Article 8 ECHR had been violated, because 
the Luxembourg courts failed to acknowledge the family ties created by the full adoption 
granted in Peru.95 The ECtHR has more often stressed the importance of granting legal 
recognition to de facto family life and in cross-border surrogacy cases this may prove a decisive 
consideration.96 It may, however, depend on the circumstances of each cross-border surrogacy 
case whether such de facto family life can be said to have (yet) been established. 
A further hint that the Court may adopt an accommodation reasoning in the pending surrogacy 
cases may be found in S H and Others where the Court noted that there was ‘no prohibition under 
Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment of infertility that uses artificial procreation 
techniques not allowed in Austria and that in the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code 
[contained] clear rules on paternity and maternity that respect the wishes of the parents.’97 Hence, 
while the ECtHR did not rule in this case that States are obliged under the Convention to 
recognise the legal effects of foreign treatment options, it accepted such recognition as an 
element contributing to the justification for prohibiting such treatment in the home country.  
While the current case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR does not provide a conclusive answer on 
this point yet, it is thus well possible that fundamental rights as protected under European law 
require States to take an accommodation approach in cross-border surrogacy cases, by 
recognising parental links lawfully established in another (Member) State.  
 
                                                                
90
 Dafeki supports this finding, although this case must be distinguished from the here discussed cross-border surrogacy 
scenario on two points: (1) it the free movement of workers and (2) in this case a birth certificate was refused recognition 
because it was rectified changing the date of birth. Dafeki, C-336/94, judgment of 2 December 1997 [1997] ECR I-6761.  
91
 Sayn-Wittgenstein, judgment of 22 December 2010 [2010] ECR I-13693 and Runevič-Vardyn, C-391/09, judgment of  
12 May 2011 [2011] ECR I-03787. 
92
 See section 2.1 above.  
93
 See n 30.  
94
 ECtHR 28 June 2007, Wagner and J M W L v Luxembourg, no. 76240/01. The Court adopted a similar reasoning  
another cross-border adoption case:  ECtHR 3 May 2011,
 
Negrepontis-Giannisis v Greece, no. 56759/08. 
95
 The Court also found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8, 
because the child (and her mother as a result) had been penalised in her daily life on account of her status as the 
adoptive child of an unmarried mother of Luxembourg nationality whose family ties created by a foreign judgment were 
not recognised in Luxembourg.  
96
 X and Others (n 53), para. 145.  
97
 S. H. and Others (n 33), para. 114.  
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3.2.2 INFORMATION, REIMBURSEMENT AND FOLLOW-UP CARE 
States may also accommodate cross-border movement by providing independent information 
about foreign treatment options, by reimbursing treatment obtained abroad or by providing 
follow-up care. As these accommodating responses in fact form the mirror image of the 
protectionist responses discussed in sections 3.1.2-3.1.4 they are here jointly discussed under 
reference to the aforementioned sections.  
As yet noted above, bans on information about foreign abortion services are incommensurable 
with the ECHR.98 In fact, from A, B and C it can be inferred that States have an obligation to provide 
for access to ‘appropriate’ information about abortion services in other countries.99  
Further, by introducing considerable rights to information for patients involved in cross-border 
care, the EU Patient Mobility Directive imposes certain accommodation obligations on the Member 
States. 100 National contact points in each Member State are to deliver information to patients 
involved in cross-border care concerning healthcare providers; information on the relevant 
standards and guidelines; information on patients’ rights, complaints procedures and mechanisms 
for seeking remedies, as well as the legal and administrative options available to settle disputes, 
including in the event of harm arising from cross-border healthcare. 101 Furthermore, in the 
Member State of affiliation, mechanisms have to be put in place to provide patients on request 
with information on their rights and entitlements relating to receiving cross-border healthcare, ‘in 
particular as regards the terms and conditions for reimbursement of costs […] and procedures for 
accessing and determining those entitlements and for appeal and redress if patients consider that 
their rights have not been respected […].’102 Healthcare providers in the State where the treatment 
takes place, for their part, have to provide relevant information on the availability, quality and 
safety of the healthcare they provide, to help individual patients to make an informed choice.103 
The Directive does not oblige Member States to deliver information in other languages than their 
official languages.104  
States may also accommodate cross-border movement in reproductive matters by providing for 
reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad, even if the treatment is not available in their 
own state. As explained above, under EU law states are free to do so, but whether they are also 
under an obligation accommodate cross-border movement in reproductive matters in this way, 
is a matter that has not yet been conclusively decided.105 There are in any case presently no 
indications in the ECtHR case-law that hint in the direction of any such obligation.  
Lastly, accommodation may take place through providing the necessary follow-up care upon 
return to the home country. As discussed in section 3.1.4 it is insufficiently clear whether under 
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 See section @2.2.  
99
 A, B and C (n 31), para. 241.  
100
 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border healthcare, OJ L88/46 (4.4.2011). 
101
 Articles 4 (2) (a) and 6 (3) Directive 2011/24/EU. The Directive makes a distinction between responsibilities of the 
Member State of treatment (Article 4) and responsibilities of the Member State of affiliation (Article 5). It is however 
inescapable that all Member States have to meet all requirements, as they may function both as States of treatment and 
States of affiliation. 
102
 Article 5 (b) Directive 2011/24/EU. 
103
 Article 4 (2) (b) Directive 2011/24/EU. 
104
 Article 4 (5) Directive 2011/24/EU.  
105
 See section 3.1.1 above.  
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EU law States are under an obligation to provide such aftercare. Under the ECHR access to 
appropriate follow-up care has in any case been set as a minimum accommodation obligation in 
cross-border abortion cases.106 It is very well possible that in future case-law the Court defines a 
similar obligation in situations involving CBRC.  
 
3.3 OUTSOURCING 
 
Cross-border movement in reproductive matters may also be considered by States as a safety 
valve, a means to ‘hide behind’ the more permissive regimes of other States. The existence of 
foreign options may take away internal pressure for change and may in fact result in inactivity 
by the legislature. For proving such a claim in the present context, further (sociological) research 
is needed, which goes outside the scope of this paper. What has become clear, however, from 
the ECtHR’s judgments in A, B and C v Ireland and S H and Others v Austria, is that this Court has 
indeed allowed States to hide behind other States’ regimes, and outsource the protection of 
rights under the ECHR in these sensitive matters.107 In both judgments foreign treatment 
options were accepted as an element contributing to the justification of prohibitive laws in 
reproductive matters.  
This outsourcing approach – entailing that for meeting its obligations under the Convention a 
Contracting Party can refer to the laws of other States – raises a number of practical questions that 
have as yet not been addressed by the Court. For example, one may wonder whether the foreign 
treatment option must also be an effective option and whether distance to the foreign option 
makes a difference in this regard.108 
 
More fundamentally, the outsourcing approach does not fit in well with the foundations and 
objectives of the ECHR, following which each State is responsible for securing the Convention rights 
to everyone within their jurisdiction.109 It is moreover not a very principled approach; it is difficult to 
understand why certain interests that have been accepted as a justification for restrictive laws on 
reproductive matters – such as the best interests of the child, or protection of the unborn –  would 
no longer hold in cross-border situations.110 In fact precisely in cross-border situations may such 
interests require even more protection. Also, in these two judgments the Court failed to take into 
account that to resort to foreign options may involve practical difficulties and costs, which may in 
itself be problematic under the Convention.111  
 
                                                                
106
 A, B and C (n 31), para. 241. 
107
 See section 2.2 above.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
European law explicitly allows for the existing diversity between the legal regimes of the EU 
Member States in reproductive matters. States are left room to make their own principled 
choices in these moral and ethical issues. However, once they decide to regulate in the area, 
they must also guarantee that the relevant legislation is coherent and provides for effective 
rights, which are moreover granted in a non-discriminatory manner. There is thus increasingly 
more implicit European influence on national standard-setting in reproductive matters.  
The room that is allowed to States to respond to cross-border movement in reproductive 
matters is potentially more limited. The present analysis has shown that warding off (the effects 
of) cross-border movement in reproductive by means of non-recognition of legal effects of 
foreign option or by means of bans on information on foreign treatment options may not be 
easily justified under European law. Refusing follow-up care may also be problematic. While a 
refusal to reimburse the costs of treatment obtained abroad may be acceptable, it is 
questionable whether prior authorisation requirements can be set.  
In fact, certain minimum accommodation obligations follow from European law and there is 
potential for these obligations to develop. The provision of independent information about 
foreign treatment options is required in all reproductive matters. An obligation to provide 
follow-up care is obligatory when a woman has had an abortion abroad, and may well be upheld 
in other CBRC situations. Further, even though this issue has not yet been decided by the CJEU, 
it is possible that, should a cross-border surrogacy case be brought before it, this Court will rule 
that fundamental rights as protected under EU law, such as the rights of the child, require that 
EU Member States recognise parental links legally established in another Member State. A 
similar obligation may follow from the ECHR, and may thus potentially also hold if third 
countries are concerned. The faits accomplis  with which States may be confronted as a result of 
cross-border movement in reproductive matters, in combination with the legitimacy of the 
regimes where these were established may thus prove forceful arguments for narrowing the 
room for manoeuvre for States in such cross-border situations.  
These (and potential other) accommodation obligations may be required by interests and 
perspectives that must be taken into account in all reproductive matters, but that may gain 
particular importance in cross-border situations. Clear examples are the rights of the child and 
the protection of (de facto) family life, but human dignity and equality may potentially also 
prove relevant. Other perspectives that hold especially in cross-border cases involving 
reproductive matters may become even more important in the future. Here, one may think of 
the burdensome character of cross-border movement in itself and of undesired implications of 
cross-border movement for the destination countries, such as the potential risk of exploitation 
of women in less wealthy countries who are involved in CBRC as egg-cell donor or surrogate 
mother.112 
The here discussed accommodation obligations do not necessarily stand in the way of moral 
pluralism in reproductive matters.113 States will only be required to facilitate cross-border 
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movement and to recognize the effects of foreign options, but will not be obliged to adapt their 
national laws to these deviating foreign standards. On the other hand, the implicit reforming 
pressure of such recognition on the national laws cannot be overlooked.  
Outsourcing instead takes away pressure for internal reform. One may, however, wonder 
whether foreign options can indeed justify more restrictive laws in the home country.114 By only 
allowing for outsourcing when certain accommodation obligations are met, the ECtHR has 
nonetheless set certain minimum standards that apply to all ECHR Contracting Parties, including 
those with less permissive regimes in reproductive matters. In the relevant cases the Court 
simply took into account what was already provided for under the national laws of the 
respective State. Future case-law will therefore have to make clear whether any further such 
accommodation obligations will be defined.115 
All in all, national regimes in reproductive matters have proven not immune for the effects of 
deviating regimes of other (European) States. It is profoundly through cross-border movement 
and in cross-border situations that States may experience that a complete isolated position in 
reproductive matters may be no longer tenable in the EU’s multilevel legal order.  
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